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Coles 1 
Building the Clinton Legacy Through Frame Alignment  
By Roberta L. Coles 
 
This article examines Clinton’s rhetorical strategy for creating a legacy in light of the 
imminent end of his second and final term as president. By examining Clinton’s public discourse 
from 1997 to 1999, with special attention to the period from September 1998 to June 1999, this 
article argues that Clinton used the frame of his race initiative to centripetally incorporate varied 
events and policies to redefine and bolster his legacy in the aftermath of scandal and political 
polarity. Specifically, President Clinton, with an eye on the legacy of the president and the identity 
of the Democratic Party, gathered the war in Kosovo and the shootings in Littleton, Colorado, 
along with their attendant disparate policies into one rhetorical frame, thereby supplying a 
conception of what Clinton’s 6 years as president had been about, a vision and mission for 
America, and an identity for the Democratic party distinct from the Republicans. 
 
Throughout 1998 and into 1999, President Bill Clinton was in the midst of, what Murray 
Edelman (1988) has termed, a political spectacle—a drama “comprised of effective and 
ineffective leaders managing the effort to cope with distressing problems and to defend the polity 
against external and internal enemies” (p. 120). The discovery and investigation of President Bill 
Clinton’s affair with Monica Lewinsky, wrapped in the cloaks of moral disdain and political 
bipartisanship, was hurdling toward an impeachment trial. In his second and final term as 
president, Clinton was faced with questions from reporters about what, if anything, he had 
accomplished as president.1 Had his loss of moral authority rendered him ineffective in foreign 
affairs? What legacy would he leave behind? Had the value of any achievement been obliterated 
by the Lewinsky scandal? Would he only go down in history as a liar? The media speculated 
about what effect “Clinton fatigue” would have on Vice President Al Gore’s chances for the 
presidency, Hillary Clinton’s run for the Senate, and on the Democratic Party as a whole.2 
Such spectacles impinge on private lives—not only of those directly involved in the 
spectacle but also of the spectators who become visually and emotionally entwined through the 
ongoing media event. Fundamentally, the myriad public selves were asking not only of President 
Clinton but also of themselves, first, “Who is Bill Clinton?” and, second, “Should an immoral 
person be president?” Does Bill Clinton have a single or mono-identity—that of a philanderer? 
And, if so, how important is that to the role of president? We now know that Clinton was not the 
first president to frolic amorously in the White House (and he probably will not be the last), so for 
some the more theoretical question concerning the appropriate relationship between private and 
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public issues, between personal morality and public affairs, became the issue in this spectacle. As 
both a target of the spectacle and a player in it, Clinton could and did perform a reflexive 
interpretative role in answering these questions.  
This article explores how Clinton’s public discourse during the spectacle abstracted 
shared meanings from current foreign and domestic issues to create a presidential legacy and 
vision for the country in light of his diminishing image and the imminent end of his second and final 
term as president. By examining Clinton’s public speeches from 1997 to 1999, with special 
attention to the period from September 1998 to June 1999 (the period of the end of the president’s 
race initiative through the war in Kosovo), I provide an analysis of the creation of meaning 
developed incrementally in Clinton’s public discourse, all of which is in the form of press 
conferences, speeches, and questionand-answer sessions found in the Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents (hereinafter referred to as WCPD). 
I argue that Clinton’s framing of the race initiative, which lasted 18 months from June 1997 
to September 1998, modifies in such a way to centripetally incorporate various events and 
policies. Together, these form a unifying master frame that essentially ignores the Lewinsky 
spectacle and simultaneously redefines and bolsters his questionable legacy in the aftermath of 
scandal and political polarity. Specifically, toward the end of 1998 and through mid-1990, 
Clinton’s discourse gathered the war in Kosovo and the shootings in Littleton, Colorado, along 
with their attendant disparate policies (such as hate crime legislation and gun control), into one 
rhetorical frame of “overcoming the fear of difference,” thereby supplying a conception of what 
Clinton’s 6 years as president had been about, a vision and mission for America, and an identity 
for the Democratic Party distinct from the Republicans. 
 
The Rhetorical Presidency 
In general, the role of the president in the signifying process has increased over the 20th 
century. According to Ceaser, Thurow, Tulis, and Bessette (1981) and Tulis (1987), we are living 
in the age of the rhetorical presidency, as popular rhetoric on the part of the president, once 
infrequently employed, now serves as a principle tool in governing. Indeed, at times speaking is a 
substitute for governing, as reflected in political scientist Mary Stuckey’s (1991) retitling of the 
presidency as “interpreter-in-chief.” Acknowledging the president’s persuasive powers and 
relative ease of access to media, Edelman (1988) has concluded that political language has 
become political reality. 
More specifically, the role of the rhetorical president is twofold. First, the president helps 
people make sense—in ways that serve presidential interests, of course—of events occurring 
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within the nation or of events occurring outside the nation that require deliberation about the 
nation’s position and role in regard to those events. The ways in which a president frames such 
events inevitably imply or suggest an identity for the nation and/or for the political party she or he 
hopes will lead the nation. The identity or image that leaders frequently seek to bestow on the 
nation is one of virtue (Anderson, 1983; Browne, 1991). The virtuous nature of the nation, which 
must be revised over time to accommodate new historical circumstances (Slotkin, 1992), often 
depends on the collaboration of the people to be fulfilled (Browne, 1991). Hence, the president 
often implores the nation to join him in a virtuous mission, which, one can easily infer, may fail if 
the nation rejects such an invitation (Coles, 1998). 
Second, as Kenneth Burke (1969, p. 391) pointed out, the president, faced with a 
multitude of piecemeal situations, must find some unitary principle from which all his major 
policies consistently radiate. What, then, might have appeared to the public as small, 
disorganized battles on various unrelated fronts appears instead as a coherent controlled agenda. 
This principle, at minimum, must give the appearance of substance to the presidential legacy, but 
when well employed, such a principle becomes a hallmark of presidential leadership. 
In 1999, President Bill Clinton abstracted a common meaning from the war in Kosovo and 
his domestic race initiative that could, first, tie various issues together in a meaningful whole and, 
second, resonate with an interpretative framework with which the American public was already 
familiar. I argue that a combination of several interpretive tools cooperated to align apparently 
disparate events into a comprehensive whole, producing an interpretive schema that in the short 
term made certain actions or policies appear as logical moral imperatives for a nation striving 
toward virtue.3 In the long term, each new policy became part of a larger, overarching vision, a 
vision that Clinton claims had been the crux of his agenda since the beginning of his presidency, 
perhaps since his boyhood. In so doing, Clinton paints an alternative legacy for himself, offers the 
Democratic Party (and future presidential candidate Al Gore) a saving identity, and asks the 
American people to prefigure a new American community. 
 
Framing, Interpretation, and Identity 
In social psychology literature, “framing” is related to a rejuvenated concern with cultural 
issues. Derived from bodies of literature in phenomenological sociology and cognitive psychology, 
framing is, in its basic form, interpretation—a process of construing or imposing meaning from or 
on a given phenomenon. According to sociologist Alfred Schutz (1970), humans gain knowledge 
about the world by structuring their experiences into mental systems of relevances (levels of 
interest and priority) and typifications, that is, classifications.4 Over time, these mental processes 
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result in a “stock of knowledge” that serves as a “scheme of interpretation” of one’s past and 
present experiences, enables one to anticipate future experiences, and becomes “sedimented” 
with each new incorporated experience (Schutz, 1970, p. 74). Although this process may sound 
clear and concrete, it is anything but. Schutz (1970) emphasized that these stocks of knowledge 
are surrounded by “zones of various gradations of vagueness, obscurity, and ambiguity” (p. 74). 
Building on the work of Schutz (1970) and others, Erving Goffman (1974, pp. 11-12) 
suggested that situations are defined according to principles of organization, which he terms 
“frames.” These frameworks allow the user to locate, perceive, identify, and label an infinite 
number of occurrences even when the user is unaware of the frameworks’ existence. In so doing, 
they render what would be seen as meaningless into something meaningful (Goffman, 1974, p. 
21). 
These ideas correlate with theories of information processing found in cognitive 
psychology literature and research, which suggest that making sense of the world requires 
scanning and selecting from one’s experience, giving meaning to the incoming information by 
processing it through cognitive schema, and storing the information for future use (Holstein, 1985, 
Mandler, 1979, Neisser, 1976, Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Such mental processing occurs in each 
individual, but because humans live in a social world with other individuals, they also occur 
between and among individuals. While each individual can and does structure and frame his or 
her experience, so also can she or he aid others in the process. No one can experience 
everything directly. We experience much of the world’s phenomena through others’ reports. We 
develop images and meanings about the things we have never directly experienced by allowing 
others (through “expert” accounts or ordinary gossip, for instance) to mediate or frame those 
images and meanings for us. 
Hence, for every given experience or event, numerous interpretations, or “multiple 
realities,” may abound (Goffman, 1974; Schutz, 1962). People often express considerable 
confusion about what and why something has happened or perceive experiences very differently 
from one another. This human need for order is akin to Kenneth Burke’s (1965) concept of piety, 
which he defines as loyalty to a symbolic past that imbues a person with a “sense of what properly 
goes with what” and creates a desire to fit experiences together into a unified whole (p. 74). 
Framing helps to reduce or eliminate the plethora of interpretations and instead, by proffering one 
master frame or interpretation, creates congruity where once there was chaos. Fulfilling that need 
must often precede one’s ability to act or to advocate an act with confidence. 
Interestingly, Burke (1965) also likened interpretation to psychoanalytic therapy, a type of 
secular conversion that effects a cure by providing the patient with a new perspective and 
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terminology that replace the patient’s “painful terminology of motives.” According to Burke, this 
transformation  
 
changes the entire nature of [the patient’s] problem, rephrasing it in a form for which there 
is a solution....Sowe need not be surprised to find evidence that, in the secular rebirth 
engineered by the psychoanalytic seer, the processes of recovery from one’s effective 
disorders are closely interwoven with a shifting of one’s intellectualist convictions, one’s 
terminology of cause, purpose, and prophecy. (p. 125)  
 
However, framing is often more than just giving any meaning or a new meaning to an 
event. According to Diani and Eyerman (1992), a frame is a form of categorization whose aim is to 
transfer meaning from what is known to what is new or, as Allen, O’ Loughlin, Jasperson, and 
Sullivan (1994) stated, a “process of placing information into a context of preconscious symbolism. 
The unconscious or preconscious references stimulate conscious judgments that might not have 
occurred if information had been framed... differently” (p. 267). For Snow and Benford (1988), the 
extent to which the frames strike a chord within dominant cultural beliefs—that is, the degree of 
cultural resonance attained by the frame—is positively correlated with success in attracting 
adherents. For instance, in the study of social movements (where most of the frame alignment 
literature is situated), Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford (1986) proposed that social 
movements must bring their politicized interpretations of events (i.e., their frames) into alignment 
with the preexisting frames of potential recruits. In other words, some of the activities, goals, and 
ideology of the social movement organization must be congruent with the individual’s interests, 
values, or beliefs before his or her participation will occur. The authors give the example of the 
civil rights movement, whose activity and demands were placed in the context of inalienable rights 
and other liberal political concepts that had long defined and given legitimacy to (i.e., resonated 
with) the American polity. Such framing helped some observers not only to understand but more 
important to passively accept, and perhaps actively support, activity to which they previously may 
not have been exposed or to which they might have been adverse.  
Frame alignment is not only concerned with aligning the meanings of the event with the 
meanings already in the minds of the audience, creating cultural resonance, but also with aligning 
the meanings of several, apparently unrelated, events to each other. In real life, no event occurs 
in a vacuum. Life is an accumulation of one event on another, although some are more salient 
than others. On occasion, it appears at least rhetorically necessary to reveal or create 
interpretative connections among apparently disparate events. In this discursive situation, frame 
alignment acts much like a pool rack that gathers the individually dispersed balls into a single 
coherent triangle.  
Coles 6 
Last, although most of the sociological literature on framing has emphasized its 
resource-building benefits (i.e., the effects on recruitment and/or public support primarily), framing 
activity also inherently involves identity construction. Most of the literature to date has focused on 
framing’s role in the collective identity of social movements (Benford, 1993; Coles, 1999; Coy & 
Woehrle, 1996; Hunt, Benford, & Snow, 1994). However, I will argue here that it applies just as 
well to the collective identity of a political party or a nation and, more important, to individual 
identity building.  
The close association between collective identity and framing lies in the way adherents of 
the frame think about themselves and by how shared experiences are interpreted (Johnston, 
Larana, & Gusfield, 1994). When people organize themselves around a common identity (such as 
that of a social movement, political party, or nation), they may act as social laboratories, 
advocating and perhaps testing new ways of life, prefiguring new forms of community (Carroll, 
1992).  
Moreover, although frame alignment can successfully make meaningful connections 
among various events and policies—enough to enable the public to make sense of the plethora of 
political happenings, act in accordance with those shared understandings, and develop a group 
identity—alone it may not be sufficient to build an individual’s presidential legacy. A legacy must 
have a sense of history—a sense of being passed down from one generation to another; it must 
have a biography. 
The growing literature on the concept of “biographing” stems from the social 
constructionist approach and suggests that, similar to framing, biographing is the management of 
consistency and continuity of life experiences (Gubrium, Holstein, & Buckholdt, 1994). As such, 
producing an integrated and meaningful interpretive biographical framework requires ongoing 
interpretation and reinterpretation of the events in one’s life. The practice and form of the 
interpretation are influenced, although not determined, by the social context and representational 
resources at hand. 
Biographing involves consideration of one’s past for some purpose, highlighting the 
defining aspects of one’s past in such a way to frame and organize one’s character and actions 
into a story that makes sense in light of the present. This comports well with establishing a legacy, 
a story of what one’s life and actions have been all about and, hence, of what one can bequest to 
his or her successor.  
Bill Clinton’s discourse, during the period addressed, ties numerous events and policies 
together under one umbrella of meaning, which helps the public understand those events. But 
Clinton does not stop there; he takes that meaning and locates its roots not only in the past 6 
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years of his presidency but also in the early days of boyhood in the South. By doing so, he offers 
an alternative interpretation of his life and life work to the public and future presidential historians.  
 
The Rhetorical Situation 
Any rhetorical strategy is only consciously planned to a limited extent. Rhetorical form and 
content is frequently constrained by events beyond the control of the speaker, and rhetoric must, 
if success is its goal, adapt to and accommodate these events. Moreover, the essence of any 
frame is necessarily a simplification of a complex issue. To be successful, it cannot be ridiculously 
simple, and it must, as mentioned before, resonate with a sufficiently broad constituency. 
The race issue has been salient in America throughout the country’s history, no less today 
than during the peak of the civil rights movement or during slavery.5  Race issues have adapted to 
include racial-ethnic groups other than the original Native Americans, African Americans, and 
European Americans. Legal reforms since the 1960s, controversial in themselves, reduced some 
disparities among the races but left the most fundamental disparities (e.g., defacto residential and 
school segregation), especially among Native and African Americans, untouched. Discomfort, 
resentment, and anger are frequently near the surface when issues of race are discussed. Race 
issues resonate across America, but in this case, Clinton was aided even more by the occurrence 
of several incidents that make a race-related frame reverberate with the American public.  
In June 1997, when the political scene was relatively quiet, Clinton had formed the 
President’s Advisory Board on Race and charged the board with delineating the disparities 
among the races, initiating dialogue on race issues around the country, and locating examples of 
Americans working cooperatively to make progress on race relations. This 18-month project 
came to be called “the race initiative.”6 Toward the end of the initiative in June 1998, the saliency 
of unresolved race issues in this country was made painfully undeniable when James Byrd, a 
Black Texan, was dragged to his death by three White men.  
About the time that the race initiative was coming to an ignominious end, the Bosnian 
situation likewise had simmered down without American military action, but it left many feeling that 
the United States had not done enough to prevent the numerous massacres. By the end of 1998, 
the Serbian government had turned its ethnic-cleansing policy from the Muslims in Bosnia to the 
Albanian Muslims in Kosovo. As the conflict in Kosovo heated up, it appeared that it would be a 
repeat of Bosnia in similarly bloody proportions. At the same time, it presented an opportunity for 
NATO to consolidate its power in Europe. Eventually, by February of 1999, when the results of 
negotiations between Slobodan Milosevic and the Kosovar Liberation Army in Rambouillet, 
France, suited neither NATO nor the Clinton administration, an undeclared war was nearing.  
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So, for most of 1997 and 1998, the race initiative was treated primarily as a domestic 
policy, whereas the Bosnian and Kosovar conflicts generally rolled along a separate foreign policy 
track. During the 15-month race initiative, on occasion and in passing, Clinton mentioned several 
ethnic conflicts around the globe as examples of racial tension,7 but his focus clearly was on 
domestic unity and domestic policies, such as housing discrimination, economic opportunities, 
educational reforms, and small business loans. Similarly, although the term ethnic cleansing is 
used on occasion to describe the conflict in Kosovo (as it was in the Bosnian conflict), the conflict 
is much more frequently referred to as a “humanitarian catastrophe” or as a disaster threatening 
the stability of the region and an impediment to the goal of a united Europe.8 The two policy 
areas—the race initiative and Kosovo—were not linked together in any elaborated way until the 
president’s personal and political interests were directly challenged.  
On September 16, 1998, at a news conference with Czech President Havel, a journalist 
inquired of President Clinton, 
 
Your initiative on race finishes this month, and your Press Secretary yesterday agreed that 
the race initiative isn’t flying because of your current problems and it was bogged down in 
the muck and mire [referring to the Lewinsky affair]. Do you regret that your personal 
problems affected your potential legacy on race and that it may just, at best, be a band-aid 
approach to racism in America? (WCPD, 1998, No. 38, p. 1807 
 
Put on the defensive, Clinton at first answered the question from the expected domestic 
policy perspective. He pointed out that legislation that would reduce the backlog of cases before 
the Equal Opportunity Commission and enforce antidiscrimination laws is currently before 
Congress. He mentioned that the administration is trying to create affirmative economic and 
educational opportunities in distressed inner-city and rural areas. But then, unexpectedly, he 
broadened the frame of reference to include a foreign policy element:  
 
But I expect this [concern with bettering race relations] to be a central part of the work I do 
in the next two years. I expect this to be a central part of the work I do for the rest of my life. 
I think in the 21st century—when you go back to World War II, and you think about the part 
of the Nazi experience that was directed against the Jews, and you look all the way 
through the ensuing years, all the way to the end of this century, down to what we’ve seen 
in Rwanda, the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo, you name it, it will be 
incumbent upon the United States to be a force for tolerance and racial reconciliation for 
the foreseeable future. (WCPD, 1998, No. 38, p. 1808)  
 
In that reply, the two policy tracks intersected. The failed race initiative collided with the 
need both for a prowar rhetoric and for a redefinition of his life work. Clinton, probably unwittingly 
at the time, began to interweave these and eventually other events (the murder of Matthew 
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Shepard, which occurred in October 1998, and later the shooting in Littleton, Colorado, which 
occurred in April 1999) to produce a rhetorical tapestry that makes sense of the upcoming 
intervention in Kosovo and simultaneously establishes a legacy for himself, a mission for the 
people, and an identity for the Democrats. This encompassing rhetorical frame is most complete 
when his audience is composed of Democratic Party officials and members from around the 
country. A series of such meetings coincided with and, hence, helped shape these other rhetorical 
events in the spring of 1999 as the party prepared for the upcoming 2000 elections. Moreover, the 
fact that these events all occurred near the turn of the millennium adds a sense of historical import 
and urgency.  
 
The Frame of “Difference”: A Psychological Problem With a Community 
Solution 
Because any particular life event is usually the result or manifestation of numerous, 
complicated factors, framing frequently necessitates a simplification or abstraction of meaning. 
The framer becomes involved in a process of abstracting certain qualities, supposedly the 
essence of the event (often informed by the special interests of the framer), from the given 
historical complexities (Burke, 1965, p. 107) of the event. Locating the essence or unitary 
principle of an event or events is a dynamic process, which underscores the importance of 
analyzing a period of discourse rather than one particular piece of rhetoric. Recognition and 
development of the principle occur over a period of time. The form of the principle may be 
influenced not only by the framer’s own interests but by other signifying events that occur and by 
the perceived needs of the audience to which the rhetoric will be directed. This can be seen in 
Clinton’s recharacterization of the race initiative over a period of a few months.  
According to Carcasson and Rice’s (1999, p. 258) analysis of Clinton’s rhetoric on the 
18-month race initiative, Clinton portrayed racial inequality as caused mostly by income inequality 
and gave short shrift to discrimination and bigotry as causative factors. However, the murders of 
James Byrd (occurring near the end of the initiative) and Matthew Shepard (occurring after the 
initiative had officially ended) and the imminent war in Kosovo redirected Clinton’s rhetoric toward 
other causative concerns. After those events, Clinton’s discourse focused more on the 
psychological determinant of racism and broadened racism to include ethnicity, sexual orientation, 
and religion—in other words, “difference.”  
Playing the role of Burke’s psychoanalyst, Clinton first clearly diagnosed America’s 
difficulties with difference as a psychological, pathological, even demonic problem. In a February 
25, 1999, interview with Janet L. Cohen of the Armed Forces Television Network, Clinton 
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established the fear of difference as a widespread but abnormal condition. He stated, 
 
That psychological problem is at the bottom of a lot of this racial and ethnic hatred around 
the world. A lot of these groups themselves are deprived of opportunity. They’ve had 
economic adversity, had all kinds of diversity [sic], and a lot of them, frankly, are taught as 
groups that what gives meaning to their lives is that they’re not a member of this other 
group; at least they’ve got somebody to look down on. (WCPD, 1999, No. 9, p. 359)9 
 
Embedding racial conflict within a psychological approach implies that this fear of 
difference and its discriminatory outcomes are mostly an individual problem, manifested in those 
who have low self-esteem, have suffered economically, or have not been reared correctly. This 
insinuates that only a few bad apples are guilty of such behavior, and every individual is left to 
decide whether he or she is one of them. Simultaneously, Clinton still avoids discussion of 
systemic discrimination that is, perhaps unintentionally, built into the routines of various societal 
institutions or that is practiced among the wealthy or middle classes.  
Overcoming this psychosis, the phobia of difference, became Clinton’s master frame and 
unitary principle through the first half of 1999, which encompassed both the war in Kosovo and a 
series of Democratic National Committee meetings in preparation for upcoming elections. Other 
policies and missions then emanated from this unitary principle.  
Clinton’s rhetoric situates this global racial conundrum in the urgency of the coming 21st 
century and juxtaposes this fear of difference as a threat to progressive technological advances 
such as genetic engineering and the Internet and the prosperous world that could come from 
globalization. Clinton described this juxtaposition at the award ceremony for the National Teacher 
of the Year in April 1999:  
 
It is truly ironic that here we stand on the verge of a new century and a new 
millennium—where education is more important than ever before, because we have this 
explosion in technology, drawing us closer to different people of different cultures, and our 
own country is becoming more diverse—we can imagine a future that is more prosperous 
and more peaceful and more interconnected, in a very human way, than ever 
before...andnowwe’vefound that that future was threatened by the oldest demon of human 
society, which is our fear of people who are different from us. (WCPD, 1999, No. 16, p. 
677)10  
 
To be consistent with the laws of physics, it would have been more accurate for Clinton to 
say that there has been an implosion in technology, as an explosion would hardly draw people 
together. In fact, a number of scholars (see Northcott, 1999) have charged that technology has 
indeed contributed to an atomization of American society. However, Clinton’s discourse overlooks 
those ideas and the fact that the vast majority of the world’s people lack access to technology or 
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the Internet. Instead, Clinton incorporates language that describes technology (particularly the 
Internet) as forces of integration battling against the disintegrating forces posed by the world’s 
obsession with difference.11 
Pitting modern technology against the fear of difference creates a prophetic dualistic 
scheme in which technology represents goodness, progress, and promise, and the American 
obsession with difference represents evil, regression to the primitive, and a threat to the future.12 
On occasion, Clinton portrays technology as a neutral phenomenon that can be used for good or 
evil, the latter being more likely when it is co-opted by people who follow their primitive urges and 
use the Internet to make terrorist bombs or racist Web sites. But more frequently, Clinton 
exonerates technology by repeating that ethnic groups around the world, particularly in Kosovo, 
are not fighting over the distribution of technology resources but over those old demons of 
difference. Painting this picture of a demonic psychosis gives the public a clear picture of the 
target problem, but Clinton must offer a positive alternative, a solution, for this frame to lead to 
proactive adherence rather than mere despair.  
When Clinton had discussed race in the 15 months (June 1997-September 1998) that the 
Advisory Board on Race existed, he repeatedly reminded his audiences that by the middle of the 
21st century, there would be no majority race in America. Expressing the fears of a few others 
before him (most notably Schlesinger, 1992), Clinton indicated that he was determined that rather 
than becoming many Americas, separate, unequal, and isolated, America should be one, 
united.13 Although Americans should appreciate, even celebrate, their differences, they more 
importantly should identify the common values that unite them. As a remedy to the fear of 
difference, he offered the “celebration of difference” but insisted that such a celebration be 
conducted within the more important embrace of commonalities as Americans. In fact, one of the 
duties of the race advisory board was to identify those American commonalities. However, by the 
start of the war in Kosovo in March 1999, the initiative had formally ended without success in that 
endeavor.14 So, Clinton used the same idea but widened the focus from American commonalities 
to universal commonalities.15  
Unfortunately, the only characteristic that Clinton could identify as commonly held 
throughout the world was that we are all humans. Hence, “our common humanity” and the 
undelineated “what we have in common is more important than what divides us” became the 
sloganistic refrains of the 2-month war.16 
However, by the middle of March 1999, Clinton offered more than just slogans to his 
audience. He invited them, particularly his Democratic listeners, into an elaborated description of 
community:  
Coles 12 
 
We believe in a profound way in the idea of community—not some sappy, purely altruistic 
idea, but that we ourselves cannot have the lives we want unless we give our brothers and 
sisters round his country, and like-minded people all around the world the same 
opportunity. (WCPD, 1999, No. 12, p. 487)  
 
With all of our increasing diversity in America, I wanted an America that really reaffirmed 
the idea of community, of belonging; the idea that none of us can pursue our individual 
destinies as fully on our own as we can when we want our neighbors to do well, too; and 
that there is some concrete benefit to the idea of community that goes beyond just feeling 
good about living in a country where you’re not discriminated against because of some 
condition or predisposition or anything else that has nothing to do with the law and nothing 
to do with how your neighbors live their lives; and that what we have in common is more 
important than what divides us. (WCPD, 1999, No. 12, pp. 491-492)17  
 
Clinton’s focus on community resonates18 with a growing perception that America’s 
cultural bent toward individualism has all but obliterated any sense of community (see Bellah, 
Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985, 1991; Cowan, 1993; Etzioni, 1993; Jason, 1997; Lyon, 
1989; Meyrowitz, 1985; and Shaffer & Anundsen, 1993, just some of the writings addressing this 
concern). However, Clinton’s concept suggested too that Americans simultaneously can have 
their individualism and community. Although he debased the idea of altruism as “sappy,” he 
proffered the pursuit of self-interest as the incentive for each individual to seek her or his 
neighbor’s well-being.  
Noteworthy here are Mary Rousseau’s (1991) writings on community. Analyzing 
Aristotle’s musings on community, Rousseau (1991, p. 30) argued that community needs to be 
based on altruism (though not the sappy kind). Merely acknowledging our common human nature, 
which Aristotle also offered as a basis for community, is insufficient to produce altruism. 
Rousseau contended that the concept of common humanity produces a false universalism that 
fails to accommodate the particularities of individuals, which is necessary for true altruism. “A 
common humanity,” Rousseau wrote, 
 
is a fine basis for civic equality, for granting the same human dignity and human rights to 
all members of the human species. It can be the basis for a certain sympathy by which we 
wish certain elements of human well-being to all of man-kind....We would then not 
discriminate in the bad sense, treating people differently on the basis of sex, color or 
age....But with such a universal sympathy, we would lose a more important and valuable 
kind of discrimination....Wewould not be able to recognize differences, and to treat 
different people differently, when it was appropriate to do so. In other words, if a common 
human nature is the only basis for one person’s identification of another as his other self, 
then the friendship becomes abstract instead of real. (p. 30) 
 
By failing to offer specific commonalities while trying to downplay Americans’ differences, 
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Clinton’s rhetorical community offers platitudes rather than pragmatic ideas for implementation.  
 
Aligning Disparate Events 
Frame alignment, the gathering in of unrelated events or policies into one master frame, 
can be done indirectly or directly. Indirectly, alignment is accomplished by merely transitioning 
from one topic to another or intermingling topics in any given speech. For instance, Clinton often 
stated that he “is now going to say a few words about Kosovo,” but his next three paragraphs 
would be about difference and hate crimes. In a couple of speeches, Clinton even relied on 
cognitive information-processing theory to make the connection. Sounding more like an 
academician than a politician, Clinton explained that the human tendency to devise mental 
categories that aid in comprehending human phenomena should be seen only as a tool and not in 
itself the truth. To think in such categorical terms, he suggested, only sets up false choices 
between domestic policy and foreign policy and false divisions among people.19  
For the most part, Clinton’s framing relies on this indirect approach. Speaking to a 
Democratic National Committee meeting in Washington in March 1999, 2 days before U.S. air 
strikes on Serbia began, he aligned support for his policy in Kosovo with support for the 
now-defunct race initiative and its attendant policies. 
 
That’s [the world being obsessed with holding others down] why I think it’s important that 
we continue the President’s Initiative on Race, which we’re doing; why I think it’s important 
that we pass the employment nondiscrimination act and the hate crimes law that I put 
before the Congress; why I think it’s important we stand up against ethnic cleansing. 
(WCPD, 1999, No. 12, p. 505) 
 
The subtle confluence of issues ties them together into one related framework, in which 
support for one policy implies support for another, and the critique of ethnic cleansing implies the 
critique of American ethnic divisions.  
But occasionally, the president overtly and directly makes the connections for people, 
often transitioning from one topic to an apparently unrelated topic by asking, “What does this have 
to do with that?” For instance, speaking in April 1999 at a Majority 2000 luncheon in Dearborn, 
Michigan, Clinton discussed social security, education, and other domestic policies and then said, 
“I want to tell you how this business in Kosovo fits with all the other things....”20  
Eventually, in remarks at a reception in New York City, Clinton suggested that the three 
remaining challenges of building the global society of the 21st century are developing a financial 
system, guarding the environment, and going “to the heart in country after country after country of 
this dark compulsion people have to hate and fight and kill each other because of their religious, 
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their racial, their cultural, or their other differences” (WCPD, 1998, No. 42, p. 2038). In other words, 
Clinton had taken his failing race initiative abroad, where fighting racial discrimination is less 
constrained by the need for persuasive dialogue and slow-moving congressional legislation but 
rather where one can fight the fear of difference with bombs and bullets. 
But Kosovo was not the only event that became aligned with the race initiative. On 
October 10, 1998, Matthew Shepard, a gay college student in Laramie, Wyoming, was brutally 
beaten to death. Clinton remarked to the public: 
 
One thing must remain clear: Hate and prejudice are not American values. I hope that... 
Americans will once again search their hearts and do what they can to reduce their own 
fear and anxiety and anger at people who are different. (WCPD, 1998, No. 42, p. 2032) 
 
Two days after the Shepard murder, Clinton spoke at a reception for the Democratic 
gubernatorial candidate of New York, where he described New York as a city with remarkable 
diversity where all kinds of people have the chance to live out their dreams. However, Clinton 
pointed out, such is not the case all over the world. In Kosovo, in the Middle East, and other places 
around the world, people are held back or crushed because others are “so animated by fear and 
their compulsive need to look down on others that whole nations are kept from becoming what 
they ought to be” (WCPD, 1998, No. 42, p. 2037). Lest Americans think they have already 
overcome this universal human condition, Clinton alluded to Matthew Shepard and reminded the 
country that “America cannot do good in the world unless America is good at home” (WCPD, 1998, 
No. 42, p. 2038). 
Then, on April 20, 1999, a multiple shooting at Columbine High School in Littleton, 
Colorado, grabbed the attention of Americans across the country. Initially, the shooting was 
portrayed within the old frame of school violence and its attendant policies of gun control and 
media regulation. However, soon some news reports indicated that the students who did the 
shooting had been teased and ostracized by some of their peers because of their lack of athletic 
prowess and the way they dressed. In turn, the victims became perpetrators by finding someone 
to target because of his differences (one of the 12 students killed was an African American boy). 
Hence, by May 14 through May 16, 1999, in another series of speeches to Democratic National 
Committee luncheons and dinners,21 Clinton aligned Littleton with Kosovo, the James Byrd and 
Matthew Shepard cases, and the policies of the Hate Crimes Act, Brady Bill (gun control) 
modifications, the Employment Nondiscrimination Act, and Timothy McVeigh’s bombing of the 
federal building in Oklahoma. The frame of difference was bursting at the seams.22  
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Effects of Clinton’s Frame Alignment 
Three main effects arise from this frame alignment process. First, focusing on one frame 
inevitably leads people to overlook alternatives at numerous political levels. Although I do not 
mean to imply that this was Clinton’s intention, going to war does shift the public focus from his 
personal morality. It reminds the public that Clinton is busy fulfilling his important presidential 
duties, which extend far beyond the activities that take place in his office. It also implies that, even 
with personal weaknesses, one can effectively perform stately tasks. 
Second, acting on the various policies related to each large issue becomes both a moral 
imperative in the process of overcoming racism. At a March 30, 1999, electronics industry dinner, 
after describing how the psychological fear of difference manifested itself in the Balkans, talking 
about the deaths of James Byrd and Matthew Shepard, and reiterating the slogans of “celebrating 
our differences” and “our common humanity,” Clinton concluded, “So I ask all of you tonight to 
support what the United States and our 18 other NATO allies are trying to do in the Balkans” 
(WCPD, 1999, No. 13, p. 540). Likewise, in an April 6, 1999, speech on the proposed Hate Crimes 
Prevention Act, Clinton reviewed the psychology exhibited in Kosovo and concluded that this is 
why passage of the hate crimes bill is so important (WCPD, 1999, No. 14, p. 587590). 
Clinton’s discourse also uses America’s existing racial diversity as a reason to support the 
military campaign in Kosovo. First, Clinton defined the war’s supporters as a diverse group of 
people.23 For instance, he defined NATO as a coalition of diverse nations, representing 780 
million people of various religions, ethnicities, and races (WCPD, 1999, No. 17, p. 710). Beginning 
in the May 1999 series of speeches to Democratic National Committees, Clinton reiterated a story 
about a Native American group’s visit to the White House. They and the president sat in a circle on 
the White House floor together, and one of the young American Indians stated how proud he 
would be to serve in Kosovo to prevent a genocide similar to that which occurred to Native 
Americans in the United States.24 In another speech to New York’s Democratic National 
Committee, Clinton added that even American Jews were for the war in Kosovo, the implication 
being that because those being ethnically cleansed in Kosovo were Muslims, Jewish support 
might not normally be forthcoming (WCPD, 1999, No. 20, p. 943). At a Sons of Italy dinner on May 
22, Clinton told a story of a Polish soldier in Kosovo and delineated the types of support the 
country of Italy is giving to the war effort (WCPD, 1999, No. 21, p. 970). Speaking on Memorial 
Day, Clinton reminded the audience at Arlington National Cemetery “how fitting it is that we are 
standing against ethnic cleansing with our wonderful myriad, rainbow, multiethnic military” 
(WCPD, 1999, No. 22, p. 1008). This diversity of support lends credibility to U.S. policy. If people 
from all these various backgrounds and varied interests support the war, how could any American 
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not? 
Last but not least, Clinton’s master frame provides a vision for the American people, an 
identity for the Democratic Party as it begins to form its platform and recruit its various candidates 
for the upcoming national elections, and a legacy for himself. All three of these radiate from the 
unifying vision Clinton concocts of the future American community, where no one can succeed 
unless his or her neighbors also succeed.  
In presenting the victory of community over the fear of difference, Clinton asks the 
American people to envision a new form of American society. Clinton’s vision offers Americans an 
escape from a year of events that viscerally remind Americans that they are far from perfect. It 
offers them a new lens by which to view themselves not as passive victims of this psychological 
demon that appears to have plagued human history but as change agents, or secular exorcists, in 
overcoming this battle between the forces of progress and integration and the forces of regression 
and disintegration. In the sense that Clinton presents this vision not as a portrait of how America 
currently is but rather as what it could be in the 21st century, Clinton is also offering the country a 
mission. For instance, after talking about Kosovo to the audience at the White House’s Seventh 
Millenium Evening, Clinton charged the audience with building a community that can withstand 
the warped side of human nature. He said, 
 
Our challenge now, and the world’s, is to harmonize diversity and integration, to build a 
richly textured fabric of civilization that will make the most of God’s various gifts, and that 
will resist those who would tear that fabric apart by appealing to the dark recesses that 
often seem to lurk in even the strongest souls. (WCPD, 1999, No. 15, p. 633) 
 
More specifically tying that challenge to specific policies, Clinton stated, 
 
If we want America to do good around the world, we have to be good at home, first. 
Second, if we want to lead the world for peace and freedom, we’ve got to stand up against ethnic 
cleansing and mass killing. That’s what Kosovo is about.25 America must set a model for the world. 
How Americans respond to both Littleton and Kosovo will say a lot about what kind of country we 
have for years to come. (WCPD, 1999, No. 20, p. 911) 
 
This vision is offered as well to the Democratic Party as the basis of their platform, as the 
collective identity that distinguishes them from the Republican Party.  
But the reason I’m here tonight, since I’m not running for anything anymore, is that I know 
that the reason we were able to follow good policies and do good things is that we started out with 
a vision and ideas that have now been embraced by my party, by the Democratic Party. And they 
make a difference. And they are different. They’re different from what we were doing before, and 
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they’re certainly different—as you can tell if you just pick up the paper in the morning— from what 
the other party believes in Washington. (WCPD, 1999, No. 20, p. 926)26  
And last, this bundle of ideas about what America and the world should look like becomes 
Clinton’s personal legacy. His discourse establishes this vision not only as something he hopes to 
pass on to America, but through biographing, Clinton implies that these ideas have been building 
throughout his life. First, Clinton makes certain it is understood by the public and party members 
that this vision was there since he first ran for president in 1991-1992. This vision is what his first 
6 years had been founded on, and it has effectively changed the face of the country. 
 
When I came to California in 1991 and early ’92, this was a very different place in a 
different country. People were divided and confused and drifting and frustrated. And I 
believed very strongly it was because we had no overriding vision for our future, no 
strategy to achieve it, no way, therefore, of pulling the American people together and 
getting us pointed in the right direction. And that’s really why I got in the race for 
President....And the work of the last six years has largely been our combined efforts to 
take these ideas and that vision and hammer them into specific proposals. It’s what 
animates our efforts today. (WCPD, 1999, No. 20, pp. 910-911)27 
 
One would expect that a president would have this unified vision of what his administration 
and term(s) in office have been about, but on occasion, Clinton took the audience further back 
than the past 6 years. Often, in one-on-one interviews, Clinton referred to his boyhood and 
explained that growing up in the South with a single mother and grandparents and with interracial 
interactions all worked together to create this man with this particular vision. One of the first times 
he did this during this period was in an interview with Janet L. Cohen of the Armed Forces 
Television Network in February 1999. After discussing military pay and recruitment issues and 
Kosovo, Cohen asked the president why he has championed the rights of the underdog. Clinton 
replied, 
 
My mother was widowed when I was born, and she was off studying to be a nurse. My 
grandparents raised me until I was 4. My grandmother worked, as well as my grandfather; 
my grandmother was a nurse. So I had always been around women who had to work to 
make a contribution to their family’s welfare. And so I think from early childhood I always 
was particularly sensitive to any kind of discrimination against women or just denial of 
opportunity. And I was always sort of rooting for them because of my mother and my 
grandmother. 
And on the race thing, I think it was because of my grandfather and the fact that 
when I was a child he had a little grocery store in a predominantly black area of this little 
town we lived in. Most of the customers were black. And most of what I learned about 
people and human nature and treating everyone the same and also discrimination, I 
learned as a little boy just listening and watching and observing and being taught.  
So, in a funny way, most... white southerners were at a disadvantage in dealing 
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with the civil rights revolution because they were raised with more explicit racial prejudice. 
But some of us were actually at an advantage because we had more human contact with 
African-Americans before others did, and if we were lucky enough to have parents or 
grandparents that taught us differently, I think it made a difference. (WCPD, 1999, No. 9, p. 
359)28 
 
Coming at a time when his moral character and legacy was under question (refer to Note 
1), Clinton in a sense acted as his own psychotherapist and took the opportunity to reinterpret 
himself. Although many were psychoanalyzing Clinton’s past to answer the question “Why is he a 
philanderer?” Clinton selected certain experiences and memories (and ignored others) of his 
administration and childhood that together offered himself and the public an alternative definition 
of his persona and life work.  
 
Discussion 
In light of the facts that the Clinton administration produced the first budget surplus 
(estimated to be about $5.5 trillion over the next 5 years) in recent years and that the country is 
currently experiencing the longest economic boom in the 20th century,29 Clinton technically had 
other legacy options to offer the public.30 However, balanced budgets lack the moral impetus on 
which to construct a biography or build support for additional policies.  
On the other hand, Clinton’s portrait of America as a diverse community in which each 
individual’s success is only possible or of value when it is contingent on another’s success 
certainly poses a moral mission to a country long struggling with the tension between the 
individual’s right to the pursuit of happiness and the community implied in a democracy of the 
people. The brother’s keeper story, or the “he ain’t heavy, he’s my brother” theme, has been 
embedded in the mythology that America was a land welcoming the overburdened. Yet, the more 
diverse the country has become and the more income inequality has increased (Johnston, 1999) 
over the past three decades, the more difficult it has become to spell out exactly and pragmatically 
what those values would entail in terms of public policy. Clinton charged the American public and 
the Democratic Party with somehow finding a way to take every American along on the ride into 
the 21st century and suggested a number of policies that would supposedly aid in achieving that 
end (i.e., gun control, hate crimes, fighting against ethnic cleansing, etc.).  
In the short term, and pragmatically speaking, such a framework got him through the war 
in Kosovo with little American dissent (the fact that he refused to use ground troops in Kosovo 
probably did not hurt either). Taking the race initiative abroad by stopping ethnic cleansing in the 
Balkans appeared easier to do and more morally urgent than solving racism here at home. Also, 
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his spurt of speeches to Democratic Party members apparently persuaded more people to donate 
to the party (Seelye, 1999). However, in terms of the specific pieces of legislation that were 
piggybacked onto this framework, outcomes were mixed. Congress failed to pass the tighter gun 
control act, leaving the gun show loophole open, and the federal Hate Crimes Act, which would 
add sexual orientation, sex, and disability to hate crimes laws.  
Moreover, it is dubious whether the American public adopted the mission for the long term 
or whether it believes the Democratic Party has such a distinct identity from the Republican Party. 
In recent years, declining voter turnout and the growing interest in third-party politics seem to 
indicate a feeling that the Democratic and Republican Parties appear as two sides of the same 
coin. Indeed, it is somewhat ironic that Clinton, who earned a reputation for bringing the 
Democratic Party closer to the political center by co-opting a number of Republican issues, such 
as crime, a balanced budget, and welfare reform (McManus, 1998), is the same person offering 
the Democratic Party a distinguishing identity. More likely, Clinton’s discourse left the 
dramaturgical presidency intact, leaving Washington insiders fascinated with the blow-by-blow 
account of partisan and personal ambition but leaving the public wondering if either party has any 
interest in the public good. 
On a more intangible level, Clinton’s rhetoric tapped into several long-standing cultural 
conflicts as well. These so-called culture wars frequently occur between the extreme ends of the 
two political parties. According to James Hunter (1999), these battles have largely, though not 
entirely, been fought over public issues concerned with private matters, such as abortion or 
homosexuality. However, underlying these battles over specific issues is a more important “war 
for the nation’s soul” (presidential candidate Pat Buchanan, quoted in Williams, 1999) or “struggle 
over who will shape the nation’s identity” (Hunter, 1999, p. 18). 
In large part, Clinton’s rhetoric attempted to accommodate, or find a compromise between 
(or pejoratively speaking, attempted to ride the fence on), both sides of the debates. Perhaps in a 
desire to please as many factions as he could, or in keeping with the American optimism that one 
can have it all, Clinton’s discourse essentially chose both individualism and community, both 
pluralism and monoculturalism. 
In addition, the timing of Clinton’s frame alignment came when his personal morality was 
under question. His sexual fidelity and lying had become the focus not only of conservatives who 
pursued impeachment but also— through seemingly unending hours of broadcasted grand jury 
videotapes and online viewing of the graphic independent counsel’s report—of the country, which 
then entered a debate over the role of personal morality in the political context. In practical terms, 
pulling disparate but pressing and salient issues together into one frame helped overshadow the 
Coles 20 
repercussions of the Lewinsky scandal. Clinton’s discourse resisted the portrayal of himself and 
his administration as one of dalliance. Instead, the reframed discourse reflexively redefined 
Clinton by conferring seriousness and depth of character to himself. His concern with race and 
community in America became the main staple of his identity, embedded there through early 
childhood experiences. Hence, the incidents of sexual promiscuity became not his primary 
identity but rather detours from his essential character. Measure of the success of the newly 
constructed identity might be found in the fact that Clinton’s job approval rating remained above 
60% for most of this period (Berke, 1999a; McManus, 1998; Nagourney & Kagay, 1998). 
Moreover, by shifting the limelight from these personal, though no longer private, concerns 
to the issue of overcoming difference and building community, Clinton refocused the discourse 
from, for lack of a better term, “micro morality” to “macro morality.” Clinton’s discourse and actions 
shifted the question from the simple and polarized “Should an immoral person be president?” (a 
question designed to fit the needs of poll takers) to a more complicated “To what extent does it 
matter if an immoral person is president?” By going to war and refocusing the discourse away 
from his personal morality to presidential issues, Clinton was essentially saying, “Regardless of 
whether I should be president, I am president, and I am doing the work of a president. Let’s talk 
about this work instead.” This refocusing suggests that in the bigger picture, racism, hate, poverty, 
and education, for instance, are also moral matters deserving more attention than any one 
individual’s morality. Clinton’s rhetoric about race and community, about leaving no one behind as 
we enter the 21st century, reminded the public that, in the process of erasing the false dichotomy 
between the personal and the political, issues of the common good are often diminished in a 
spectacle-oriented media culture, where frequently the adversarial human interest story, albeit 
here a presidential one, becomes the focal point, while history, social structure, and inequalities 
are elided (Edelman, 1988).31 To some extent, Clinton’s rhetoric may have been effective in this 
regard, as the majority of the public, according to most surveys, did not think his personal morality 
was sufficient justification for a political impeachment.32  
On the other hand, this is not to say that Clinton’s discourse on race and war was intended 
to or succeeded in enlightening the public on the historical or structural aspects of these issues. 
Indeed, Clinton’s focus on the psychological aspect of difference meant other reasons for conflict 
(domestic or foreign)— economics, politics, Western intervention, debt, and so forth—were 
ignored. Blame is focused on a warped human nature, not on structural elements. Bringing 
Kosovo into this psychological explanation implies that if one crazed individual—Milosevic (the 
human interest angle)—could be removed from power, the ethnic problems would be resolved. 
The psychological focus also assures Americans that racism is not only an American problem but 
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is practiced around the world, perhaps to a greater degree. Americans can then feel better about 
themselves, put the domestic race initiative behind them, and focus for the time being on helping 
others who suffer from racism worse than theirs.  
In sum, this study outlines the ways frame alignment processes can serve a variety of 
ends at one time. Here, they worked to build (or at least attempted to build) support for a variety of 
originally unconnected issues, which is the use that scholars usually attribute to frame alignment. 
But here also, frame alignment created a sense of mission and identity for a party and a nation 
and helped to construct a legacy for an outgoing president. In addition, I posed biographing, a 
social constructionist concept more commonly used in ethnographic studies of client-therapist 
discourse, as a frame alignment process that can be used in political discourse. This raises a 
number of questions for further research. Presidential public discourse generally presents few 
opportunities for most presidents to elaborate on their personal lives or childhood experiences; 
presidents normally refrain from personalizing public proclamations, speeches to Congress, 
declarations of war, and so forth. To what extent can biographing add to or subtract from the 
credibility of advocated policies or of the advocate? Can biographing, or frame alignment in 
general, in some paradoxical fashion effectively maintain the curiosity of the public through 
human interest but simultaneously focus the public on issues of social and common good? 
Because Clinton used biographing mostly in one-on-one interviews or in speeches to party 
members, the “appropriateness” of the context of biographing may very much determine its 
effectiveness. How much control can a public figure exert over his or her self-definition through 
the use of frame alignment processes? And to what extent can presidents or any public figure 
discursively determine how his or her legacy will be recorded in future historical texts?  
This also brings us to a weakness in many rhetorical or discursive analyses and present 
here as well: Most such studies, if they measure the efficacy of rhetoric at all, do so by asking 
whether the discourse comported with established rhetorical devices and strategies rather than 
by measuring the effect of the rhetoric on the audience. To be sure, such measurements are 
difficult to ascertain in the real world where controlled experimental contexts cannot be created. 
Nevertheless, study of the impact and/or effectiveness of this particular framing performance 
would be enhanced by further long-term analyses of Democratic Party rhetoric to identify 
substantive changes that may be due to Clinton’s discourse or by qualitative studies of local 
initiatives (such as community race dialogues or grassroots projects designed to enhance 
community relations33)to determine their frequency and motivation. As to Clinton’s legacy, the 
next glut of history textbooks and presidential biographies may be more telling, as the 
interpretative frameworks they offer of the Clinton presidency may have more long-term force in 
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shaping the Clinton legacy than anything Clinton himself may have said.  
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Notes 
1. For instance, on January 21, 1998, Jim Lehrer asked Clinton on the PBS News Hour, 
“What should the American people think about their President right now? You’re going into...the 
last 3 years of your administration: you got all this controversy today” (Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents [WCPD], 1998, No. 41, p. 113). On September 2, 1998, at a press 
conference with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, a UPI reporter asked, “Speaking of the 
challenges that we face as a nation...hasthereaction since your admission of a relationship with 
Ms. Lewinsky...givenyouany cause for concern that you may not be as effective as you should be 
in leading the country?” (WCPD, 1998, No. 36, p. 1691). On September 16, during a press 
conference with President Havel of Czechoslovakia, a reporter prodded, “What do you say to 
people who have said that you have lost all the moral authority to lead this Nation or to conduct 
foreign affairs?” (WCPD, 1998, No. 38, p. 1805). In a March 19, 1999, news conference, a 
reporter asked Clinton whether his legacy will be about lying (WCPD, 1999, No. 12, p. 479). And 
in a question-and-answer session with newspaper editors on April 15, 1999, a reporter inquired, 
“As you near the end of your second term in office and deal with such issues as the Balkans, what 
legacy do you believe you are leaving to the American public?” (WCPD, 1999, No. 15, p. 652). 
2. For instance, “The Man Who Won’t Say Why,” an editorial in The Economist (May 22, 
1999, p. 33) argued that Americans will yearn for a new president with some degree of reserve 
after Clinton. And “New York’s Musical Chairs,” an editorial in the May 29, 1999, issue of The 
Economist, argued that Hilary was too identified with what could increasingly be a “sleazy-looking 
lame-duck administration” (p. 30). See also Berke (1999a). Later in the year, see Berke (1999b) 
and Kohut (1999). 
3. By using the term disparate, I do not intend to imply here that race relations in America and 
in the Balkans have no commonalities. Indeed, many of the same social, economic, and 
psychological factors are probably present in both situations. Moreover, at times race relations in 
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one country can affect race relations in another. Frame alignment can often serve the purpose of 
educating people as to the real intersections of various superficially unrelated issues. However, 
the point here is that in this situation, Clinton’s race initiative had not aspired to making those 
types of connections previously. It had focused only on domestic issues, and then only on race 
(not difference), until the war in Kosovo and the need for a Democratic Party identity and a legacy 
became salient.  
4. See Schutz (1970, chap. 5, pp. 111-122).  
5. See Goldzwig (1999). The articles in this special issue address various rhetorical 
strategies in regard to civil rights since World War I.  
6. See Carcasson and Rice (1999) for an excellent analysis of the rhetorical components of 
the initiative. 
7. Clinton sometimes listed various global ethnic conflicts, such as those in India, Northern 
Ireland, Rwanda, the Middle East, Russia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. See, for instance, “Opening 
Remarks in a Roundtable Discussion on Race in Akron, Ohio” (WCPD, Vol. 33, No. 49, pp. 
1957-1959); “Remarks to the 75th Annual Convention of the American Federation of Teachers in 
New Orleans, Louisiana” (WCPD, 1998, No. 30, pp. 1432-1439); and “Remarks to President’s 
Advisory Board on Race” (WCPD, 1998, No. 39, pp. 1834-1838).  
8. This frame was not eliminated but was moved to a peripheral position, particularly in the 
speeches to the Democratic audiences. In his speeches specifically related to Kosovo, Clinton 
frequently continued to define Kosovo less in its ethnic framework and more in its humanitarian 
and regional framework. In addition, as the conflict in Kosovo built during fall 1998 and Clinton 
was forced to discuss the conflict more frequently, he often apologized whenever he had to 
mention it within a nonrelated speech, again suggesting that Clinton originally did not see Kosovo 
as linked to other issues. For instance, on October 6, 1998, during remarks to the annual meeting 
of the IMF and World Bank, he said, “Before I begin my remarks, I hope you will permit me to say 
a few words about another issue of real concern to the international community...thesubject of 
Kosovo” (WCPD, 1998, No. 41, p. 1983). In his remarks on health maintenance organizations 
later in the day, he said, “Since this is the only time I’ll have to talk to the press for the next several 
hours, I hope you will indulge me for a moment while I make a few comments about the present 
situation in Kosovo” (WCPD, 1998, No. 41, p. 2008). 
9. See similar statements at “Remarks at the Legislative Convention of the American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees” (WCPD, 1999, No. 12, p. 505); “Remarks 
on the Proposed ‘Hate Crimes Prevention Act’ ” (WCPD, 1999, No. 14, pp. 588-589); “Remarks at 
a Majority 2000 Luncheon in Dearborn, Michigan” (WCPD, 1999, No. 15, p. 663); “Remarks in a 
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Roundtable Discussion With Students on Violence in Schools at T.C. Williams High School in 
Alexandria, Virginia” (WCPD, 1999, No. 16, p. 692); and “Remarks in a Discussion Entitled ‘The 
Third Way: Progressive Governance for the 21st Century’ ” (WCPD, 1999, No. 17, p. 738). 
10. See similar quotations in, for instance, “Remarks at a Democratic National Committee 
Dinner” (WCPD, 1999, No. 12, p. 505); “Remarks on the Proposed ‘Hate Crimes Prevention Act’ ” 
(WCPD, 1999, No. 14, p. 589); “Remarks at the Seventh Millennium Evening at the White House” 
(WCPD, 1999, No. 15, p. 632); “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors in San Francisco, California” (WCPD, 1999, No. 15, p. 646); and 
“Remarks at a Union of American Hebrew Congregations Dinner Honoring Rabbi David 
Saperstein” (WCPD, 1999, No. 17, p. 743). 
11. See, for instance, “Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Dinner” (WCPD, 1999, 
No. 12, p. 511); “Remarks at the Seventh Millennium Evening at the White House” (WCPD, 1999, 
No. 15, p. 632); and “Remarks at a Question-and-Answer Session With the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors in San Francisco, California” (WCPD, No. 15, p. 646).  
12. Prophetic dualism is a rhetorical strategy that essentially divides the world into two 
camps—one good, the other evil. The division allows for no neutrality or compromise, only total 
victory. For a more elaborate discussion of prophetic dualism, see the work of Wander (1984).  
13. See, for instance, “Remarks at the University of California–San Diego Commencement 
Ceremony in LaJolla, California” (WCPD, Vol. 33, No. 25, pp. 877, 882); “Commencement 
Address at Portland State University in Portland, Oregon” (WCPD, Vol. 33, No. 25, p. 1122); and 
“Remarks to the 75th Annual Convention of the American Federations of Teachers in New 
Orleans, Louisiana” (WCPD, 1998, No. 30, p. 1434).  
14. See Carcasson and Rice (1999), who argued that the race initiative was a failure in a 
number of ways. Although Clinton (1996) had mentioned in his book Between Hope and History 
support of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution as ideals that Americans have in 
common, that theme was rarely mentioned in his public rhetoric during this period. 
15. Although I do not imply that this was Clinton’s intention, universal commonalities are more 
progressive than American commonalities if viewed from a Marxist perspective. Nationalism, in 
one sense just a higher form of tribalism, still pits one country against another.  
16. See, for instance, “Remarks at the National Governors’ Association Meeting” (WCPD, 
1999, No. 8, pp. 282-283); “Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Dinner” (WCPD, 1999, 
No. 12, p. 502); “Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Dinner” (WCPD, 1999, No. 12, p. 
511); and “Videotape Address to the Serbian People” (WCPD, 1999, No. 12, p. 521).  
17. These descriptions occurred most frequently in a series of speeches at Democratic 
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National Committee luncheons and dinners, which began in March 1999 (WCPD, 1999, Nos. 11 
and 12), just a few days before the United States begins air strikes in Serbia. However, the bulk of 
them occurred in May 1999 (WCPD, 1999, Nos. 19 and 20), during the peak of the war.  
18. Clinton himself is aware of the need for his rhetoric to resonate with the public. He stated 
specifically that the Democratic Party needs to take a message to the people that “resonates with 
them.” See “Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Reception” (WCPD, 1999, No. 12, p. 
485); “Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Dinner in Portola Valley, California” (WCPD, 
1999, No. 20, p. 903).  
19. See “Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Dinner” (WCPD, 1999, No. 12, p. 
502); “Remarks at a Union of American Hebrew Congregations Dinner Honoring Rabbi David 
Saperstein” (WCPD, 1999, No. 17, pp. 744-745).  
20. “Remarks at a Majority 2000 Luncheon in Dearborn, Michigan” (WCPD, 1999, No. 15, pp. 
658-659). See also “Remarks at a Union of American Hebrew Congregations Dinner Honoring 
Rabbi David Saperstein” (WCPD, 1999, No. 17, p. 743); “Remarks at a Democratic National 
Committee Luncheon in Seattle, Washington” (WCPD, 1999, No. 20, p. 899); “Remarks at a 
Democratic National Committee Dinner in Portola Valley, California” (WCPD, 1999, No. 20, p. 
905); and “Remarks at a Democratic Congressional and Senate Campaign Committees Dinner in 
Beverly Hills, California” (WCPD, 1999, No. 20, p. 913). 
21. These are all located in WCPD (1999, No. 20).  
22. In early May 1999, Clinton tried to incorporate the tornadoes in Oklahoma into his 
framework, but he failed to find an element of difference or diversity with which to make the 
connection. It is incorporated only in his May 7, 1999, speeches that took place in Texas.  
23. This is apparently a common technique in war rhetoric, as it was also used by Bush in his 
prowar discourse in the Persian Gulf War. He frequently identified the allied coalition as 
composed of nations of various races, ethnicities, religions, forms of government, and so forth 
(see Coles, 1998).  
24. See “Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Luncheon in Seattle, Washington” 
(WCPD, 1999, No. 20, p. 900); “Remarks at a Congressional and Senate Campaign Committees 
Dinner in Beverly Hills, California” (WCPD, 1999, No. 20, p. 915); “Remarks at a Democratic 
National Committee Dinner in Las Vegas” (WCPD, 1999, No. 20, p. 928); “Remarks at a 
Democratic National Committee Luncheon in New York City” (WCPD, 1999, No. 20, p. 943); and 
“Remarks at the Sons of Italy Foundation Dinner” (WCPD, 1999, No. 21, p. 970).  
25. “Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Dinner in Las Vegas” (WCPD, 1999, No. 
20, p. 927). See also “Remarks at a Democratic National Campaign Dinner” (WCPD, 1999, No. 12, 
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p. 506) and “Remarks at a Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committees Dinner” (WCPD, 1999, 
No. 19, p. 877).  
26. Similarly, see “Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Dinner” (WCPD, 1999, No. 
12, p. 505); “Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Dinner in Austin” (WCPD, 1999, No. 
19, p. 847); and “Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Reception in Las Vegas, Nevada” 
(WCPD, 1999, No. 20, p. 923).  
27. Similarly, see “Remarks at the Legislative Convention of the American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees” (WCPD, 1999, No. 12, pp. 491492); “Remarks at a 
Democratic National Committee Luncheon in Houston, Texas” (WCPD, 1999, No. 19, p. 841); 
“Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Luncheon in Seattle, Washington” (WCPD, 1999, 
No. 20, p. 897); “Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Dinner in Portola Valley, 
California” (WCPD, 1999, No. 20, p. 903); “Remarks at a Democratic National Committee 
Luncheon in San Diego, California” (WCPD, 1999, No. 20, p. 916); “Remarks at a Democratic 
National Committee Reception in Las Vegas, Nevada” (WCPD, 1999, No. 20, p. 923); “Remarks 
at a Democratic National Committee Luncheon in New York City” (WCPD, 1999, No. 20, p. 944); 
and “Remarks at the White House Community Empowerment Conference in Edinburg, Texas” 
(WCPD, 1999, No. 21, p. 986).  
28. That quote is Clinton’s most extensive example of biographing from his boyhood, but he 
repeated abridged versions in an “Interview With Dan Rather of CBS News” (WCPD, 1999, No. 13, 
p. 553); “Remarks on the Proposed Hate Crimes Prevention Act” (WCPD, 1999, No. 14, p. 588); 
and in “Remarks at the Majority 2000 Luncheon in Dearborn, Michigan” (WCPD, 1999, No. 15, p. 
661).  
29. The U.S. economy reached a growth rate of 6.1% in the last quarter of 1998. See Uchitelle 
(1999) and Broder and Sanger (1999).  
30. Some felt he could claim the environment as a legacy as well because Clinton’s 
administration had fought for protection of Florida’s Everglades, Utah’s red rock, and California’s 
redwood forest. See the The New York Times editorial, “A Forest Legacy?” (October 18, 1999, at 
http://www.nytimes.com). Also, an article (Deans, 1999) in the Wisconsin State Journal 
suggested that Clinton’s legacy was his work toward building a global economy (written during the 
Seattle protests over the World Trade Organization, it was not, however, framed as a positive 
legacy).  
31. See also Stabile (1995), whose study of the television program Roseanne argued that 
conceptualizing cultural change as a battle between conservative/recuperative or 
progressive/resistant ideologies limits understanding of economic factors that may play a more 
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important role in determining the apparent cultural modifications. 
32. According to polls, close to 60% did not think Clinton should be impeached. However, a 
similar percentage thought that if he were impeached, he should just resign. See “Relying on Polls 
Could Be a Dangerous Strategy for Clinton to Follow” (Boston Globe, December 16, 1998; 
accessed online at http://www.jsonline.com). 
33. For instance, in Madison, Wisconsin, several small groups of individuals began meeting to 
discuss race relations due to the president’s focus on race. Another Madison organization, 
Madison Urban Ministries, began a campaign of lawn signs that read “Let Your Light Shine. Fight 
Racism.” Although the “success” of such groups would be difficult to define and measure, they 
nevertheless were a response to Clinton’s rhetoric. The publication Pathways to One America in 
the 21st Century: Promising Practices for Racial Reconciliation, written by the President’s 
Advisory Board on Race (and accessed online through http:\\www.whitehouse.gov) reviews some 
local efforts in regard to race issues started during the initiative, but a systematic study that looked 
at community-building initiatives as well would be helpful. The two sets of grassroots initiatives 
(race dialogues and community-building initiatives) may or may not intersect. Some have argued 
that the past era of close-knit communities that Americans hanker for existed because they were 
racially homogenous and exclusive communities, building their closeness on keeping others out. 
See Shaffer and Anundsen (1993) for instance.  
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